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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, a strong upheaval in the use of
alternative forms of organization gave way to increased
attention in the academic literature to the performance effects
of,inparticular,strategicalliancesandmergersandacquisitions
(M&A). Whereas mergers and acquisitions and strategic
alliances are primarily known for their ability to facilitate
entryintonewmarketsandtheireffectivenessinachievingscale
and scope economies we would like to focus on their effects on
the innovative performance of companies involved.
In spite of the vast and rapidly growing body of literature
on the use and structure of strategic alliances and mergers
and acquisitions, there are hardly any studies that address
the question of whether one mode of partnering is superior
to the other in terms of strengthening the innovative
capabilities of the partners involved. Moreover, no exten-
sive review of the empirical literature on this speciﬁc
research topic is available. Given the growing importance of
innovation for the competitive position of companies
(Porter, 1990) and the fact that innovation is shown to be
one of the driving forces of 20th century growth (Franko,
1989) it is of eminent importance that we study the effect of
alternative governance mechanisms on the innovative
performance of companies (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002).
Since, no general conclusions have been drawn based on the
existing literature, knowledge accumulation is inhibited. It
is unclear which research questions have already been
answered and which are still open for further exploration.
The lack of a coherent overview also implies that
practitioners have no empirically validated guidelines
when preparing for the best mode of organizing for
innovation. Should managers opt for M&A or an alliance
if they intend to increase innovation? What speciﬁc
circumstances affect this choice? What type of alliance is
best suited to a particular situation? The absence of an
exhausting overview of empirical ﬁndings so far, makes it
impossible to even begin answering these questions. Hence,
there is a necessity for a review of empirical studies on the
effect of M&A versus alliances on innovation.
2. Trends in strategic technology alliances and M&A
The label ‘strategic alliance’ has been used to denote a
variety of interﬁrm relationships (Hagedoorn and Osborn,
1997). We refer to strategic alliances as co-operative
agreements in which two or more separate organizations
team up in order to share reciprocal inputs while maintain-
ing their own corporate identities. Although strategic
technology alliances were virtually unknown before the
1980s they have become much more prevalent during the
past two decades (see Fig. 1).
Over this period, the growth in the number of newly
establishedstrategictechnologyallianceshasbeenveryhigh,
especially in the second half of the 1980s. This period of
strong growth coincided with an era of worldwide structural
and technological change. During the 1980s, a rapidly
growing number of companies started to trade their
traditional internal innovation practices for new forms of
co-operation such as joint ventures, joint development
agreements and various types of technology-sharing agree-
ments. At that time, ﬁrms seemed to discover that these new
formsofagreementsgavethemapreviouslyunknowndegree
of ﬂexibility in terms of their ability to deal with complex
rapidly changing technological environments. At the end of
the 1980s, the number of newly established strategic
technology alliances seems to level off. During this period,
companies became increasingly aware of the fact that
strategic alliances where not a panacea to all their problems.
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failures. At that time, mortality rates of alliances were
estimated at ﬁgures between 50 and 70%. The inherent
unstable character of alliances in combination with the
difﬁculties associated with the management and control of
such alliances induced ﬁrms to be particularly careful in
undertaking alliances with other companies. However, a
further increase in competitive pressure and the ever-rising
costs of R&D in conjunction with shrinking technology/
product life cycles accelerated the formation of strategic
technology agreements once again in the mid 1990s. Today,
alliances have become an important vehicle for keeping up
with turbulent technological change, even though average
alliancesuccessratesremainedpoor.Whetherthestrategyto
increaseinnovationbymeansofalliancesiseffective,willbe
discussed in the ensuing review of studies into this issue.
2.1. Mergers and acquisitions
Apart from the use of strategic technology alliances as a
means to externally acquire innovative capabilities, full
integration of innovative capabilities through mergers and
acquisitions remains another option. Mergers and acqui-
sitions occur when independent companies combine their
operations into one new entity. Such combinations can refer
to the merging of two more or less equal companies as well
as to acquisitions where one company obtains majority
ownership in another company (Hagedoorn and Duysters,
2002). Recent contributions in the innovation literature have
clearly pointed at the growing importance of mergers and
acquisitions in the knowledge acquisition process. Whereas
strategic alliances started to emerge in the 1970s, mergers
and acquisitions have a much longer-standing history. The
ﬁrst M&A wave can be traced back to the turn of the century
in the united stated. The second wave took place in the late
1920s whereas the third and fourth wave peaked in 1968 and
the mid 1980s, respectively. Until the year 2000, we were in
the middle of a signiﬁcant merger wave (see Fig. 2), which
according to company reports was mainly induced by
technological change.
Over the past decade, we have witnessed unprecedented
growth levels in the number of M&A transactions per year.
Within 5 years, the total transaction value of M&As went up
from an already impressive $1 trillion in 1995 to over $4
trillion in the year 1999. Throughout the 20th century, the
primary motivation of companies for entering into M&As
has changed dramatically. Whereas, during the ﬁrst M&A
wave, ﬁrms were primarily trying to achieve market
domination, the second wave was clearly characterized by
a move towards vertical integration and product-line
extension. During the 1950s, tougher US anti-trust laws
set the stage for a new era in which conglomerate mergers
replaced vertical and horizontal mergers. In the 1980s and
1990s, vertical integration and diversiﬁcation became in
vogue again. The most recent merger wave is sparked by the
emergence of the Internet, the growing importance of
biotechnology and the need for many ‘brick and mortar’
companies to prepare themselves for a ‘click and mortar’
future. Although the role of innovation as a motive for
mergers and acquisitions has been largely neglected in the
older literature (Link, 1988; de Jong, 1976) more recent
work has addressed the growing importance of this motive
for companies engaged in M&As (Chakrabarti et al., 1994;
Grandstrand et al., 1992; Hitt et al., 1991; Gerpot, 1995;
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Today, M&As are found to
be increasingly used to absorb complementary external
technological capabilities needed to compete successfully in
radically changing economies. Whether this is an effective
strategy compared to entering into alliances can be clariﬁed
by studying the existing empirical literature about this topic.
Before turning to this, we will brieﬂy summarize the
theoretical arguments concerning the relation between
alternative organizational forms and innovation success.
3. Theory on the effect of M&A and alliances
on innovation
Although traditional M&A motives such as, market
entry, growth, improved efﬁciency, diversiﬁcation and risk
reduction have been described extensively in the academic
Fig. 1. Number of newly established strategic technology alliances per year
(1970–2000), 3-year moving averages, source: MERIT-CATI.
Fig. 2. Number of newly established mergers and acquisitions per year
(1985–2000). Source: Thomson Financial.
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particular motives that are associated with innovative
renewal. M&A may stimulate innovation for a number of
reasons. Technological know how is often tacit and can
therefore not be easily transmitted from one ﬁrm to another
(Larsson et al., 1998). In order to avoid high transaction
costs, ﬁrms may be inclined to engage in an acquisition in
order to solve problems related to the transmission of tacit
knowledge (Bresman et al., 1999). Furthermore, M&As
may raise the overall R&D budgets of companies involved.
This allows them to reap economies of scale and enables
them to tackle larger R&D projects than each individual
ﬁrm could have done. In this way, fundamental research
may receive more attention, leading to more advanced
technologies being developed. Also, a larger budget enables
a company to enter into more research projects, thus
spreading the risk of innovation. Furthermore, ﬁrms having
complementary knowledge can combine their speciﬁc
strengths and develop new technologies or products that
each partner on its own would not have been able to create
(Gerpott, 1995). This may have two effects: either an
innovation emerges which would not have been possible
without the collaboration or an innovation is realized much
faster than when the partners would not have collaborated.
Finally, companies are rarely efﬁcient at all aspects of
innovation management. Companies are likely to employ
different innovation management techniques. An exchange
of best practices within the merged entity will raise R&D
productivity: i.e. with the same budget more new technol-
ogies can be developed.
On the other hand, M&As face some grave barriers to
innovation as well. The most obvious one is that mergers
require so much time of so many individuals involved that it
diverts management attention away from innovation. This
may be a short run effect, but in quite some cases the
organizations of the partners have not yet integrated, many
years after the merger was announced. Furthermore, the
failure rate of mergers in general is high. Even when the
merger is successful in terms of the integration of R&D
departments, in other business areas the merger may not be a
success, prompting a disintegration of the company.
Positive effects on innovation will then be undone. Post-
merger integration management apparently is not an easy
task (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). Finally, a disadvantage of
M&A is that it involves entire companies whereas the
advantages for knowledge exchange may be limited to only
a small part of the companies involved. In mergers
and acquisitions, knowledge that is not required at all is
acquired as well. So-called cherry picking, like in the
case of alliances, is therefore not possible. This may
cause indigestibility: a company may acquire more
knowledge than it can use in a meaningful way (Hennart
and Reddy, 1997).
Alliances may stimulate innovation for similar reasons as
M&A. Co-operative agreements can ease a number of
transactional and contractual differences (Williamson,
1975, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Jarillo, 1988). In particular,
when asset speciﬁcity is intermediate, alliances are
considered to be the governance mode of choice. Further-
more, lower risk of large research projects and the
integration of complementary knowledge may also increase
innovation through alliances. Costs of developing new
generations of chips, aircrafts or computers may be up to
billions of dollars. Only very few ﬁrms are able to ﬁnance
these projects by themselves. Even the largest companies try
to lower the risks associated with these projects by
spreading the costs over a number of partners. Teaming
up with competent partners may also lead to a signiﬁcant
reduction in lead times. In high-tech markets where prices
sometimes decline by more than 30% a year, it is obvious
that the ability to bring products to the market more rapidly
can offer a signiﬁcant competitive advantage. An alliance
speciﬁc reason why alliances may increase innovativeness
lies in the radar function of alliances (Duysters and de Man,
2003). Alliances enable ﬁrms to scan their environment for
promising new technologies at low cost. Instead of investing
in all technological opportunities, alliances make it possible
for a ﬁrm to get a ‘sneak preview’ of a variety of
technological opportunities without fully committing to
them. The most promising technology may be brought into
the company. Less promising technologies can be aban-
doned. A wider variety of technological opportunities thus
become available to the company. Finally, in contrast with
the indigestibility argument of M&As, alliances can aim at a
very speciﬁc piece of knowledge. All other knowledge and
technologies can be excluded from the alliance. This form
of precision targeting (or cherry picking) is likely to make
alliances more successful than M&As in generating new
products and processes.
Alliances may also have a negative effect on innovation
because knowledge transfer across organizations is notor-
iously difﬁcult. Differences in corporate culture, processes
and knowledge base may impede a smooth transition of
knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Another reason for
alliances to fail at innovating may be that partners in
alliances are often competitors. Fear of helping a competitor
to develop a new technology may be an incentive to hold
back in the alliance, for example, by not assigning the best
people to the alliance or by withholding certain research
results. Firms are often said to enter an agreement with a
‘secret agenda’. These ﬁrms do not participate in the
co-operation for mutual beneﬁt but have the incentive to
absorb the other partner’s knowledge, skills and other
assets (Duysters, 1996). Finally, although failure rates of
alliances are lower than those for M&A, they still are around
50%. An alliance can break up for many reasons even when
it is a technological success. Strategic, operational
and cultural differences between partners play an important
role in this.
This non-exhaustive overview of the success and failure
reasons of M&As and alliances shows that there is no
theoretical reason, a priori, to favor one over the other.
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theoretical proposition has been advanced to sway the
argument. Hence it is all the more necessary to look at the
empirical evidence in order to decide on the relative merits
of alliances versus M&A for increasing innovation.
4. Selection of papers
Papers for the review have been selected based on a
number of criteria. First of all, only large-scale empirical
studies are included. Numerous case studies have been
executed into the relationship between alliances, M&A and
innovation. They have delivered quite some insights into the
processes underlying innovation management. Because of
the limited sample of case studies, however, it is often not
possible to draw general conclusions from them. That is
why case studies have not been incorporated in this
literature overview. Secondly, a clearly deﬁned measure
of success has to be present in the papers. A considerable
amount of papers studies the use of either M&A or alliances
under certain conditions, but only a limited amount of
papers actually take an in-depth look at the success of these
strategies. This is especially true for complex alliance
strategies and network level effects. Empirical studies into
networks are available (Gulati, 1999; Hite and Hesterly,
2001; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), but only a handful actually
connects network strategies and network positions to
success measures. Thirdly, papers have to be published in
refereed journals or need to be presented at a renowned,
refereed academic conference. This criterion is added in
order to guarantee a certain level of quality. When papers
have gone through a review process for a journal or
conference, an independent check on its accuracy and
reliability has taken place. Fourthly, innovation is deﬁned
narrowly in terms of R&D. Non-technological aspects of the
innovation process as well as innovation in service sectors
were not included. Likewise, the effect of alliances and
M&A on the diffusion of innovation is excluded from this
research. This narrow focus limits the scope substantially,
thereby making it easier to draw well-founded conclusions
about the topic of collaboration and innovation. Finally, for
alliances a relatively broad deﬁnition of alliances is used,
following Duysters and Hagedoorn (2000b). This includes
the entire spectrum from licensing via R&D consortia to
minority investments. Research into the performance of
networks is also included.
In our study, it turned out that these criteria are rather
strict. In total, some 30 papers on alliances and 15 papers on
mergers and acquisitions were able to meet these criteria
(see Appendix A). Undoubtedly, the application of these
criteria means that a large part of research in this area is not
reﬂected in this paper. This approach, however, guaranteed
a meaningful comparison between different research results.
5. Review of literature: alliances
The articles selected on technology alliances can be
divided into two main categories. The ﬁrst category consists
of articles measuring the effect of alliances on the
technology position of companies. Success measures that
are used in these papers reﬂect the number of patents, R&D
investments, assessments of product and process inno-
vation, R&D productivity and licenses. The second category
of papers investigates the effect of technology alliances on
the economic performance of the ﬁrms involved. The latter
papers measure whether companies entering into technol-
ogy alliances exhibit higher share prices, margins, return on
investment, survival rates or growth. First, the general
ﬁndings of the review are discussed. Next, a more detailed
discussion of the impact of success measures, the regional
spread and the sectoral background of the reviewed articles
is provided.
Fig. 3 shows the percentage of articles that show a
positive, neutral or negative effect of alliances on inno-
vation. The ﬁgures pertain to the number of hypotheses
studied in the articles reviewed. For example, Anand and
Khanna (2000) ﬁnd a positive effect of joint ventures but a
neutral effect of licensing. Both these ﬁndings have been
taken into account in Fig. 3. Below a more detailed
discussion of the research ﬁndings is presented. The ﬁrst
preliminary ﬁnding is that research is surprisingly uniform
in its conclusions. Almost three quarters of the hypotheses
tested, ﬁnd that alliances increase innovation.
Two qualiﬁcations apply to this positive result. First, the
impact of collaboration on innovation increases when the
management of the ﬁrms involved is better equipped to
manage alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Gray et al.,
2001; Powell et al., 1996; Takeishi, 2001). Firms with more
alliance experience or ﬁrms that have more alliance
management tools in place clearly outperform ﬁrms without
a well-developed capability to manage alliances.
Second, alliances of which the partners have an overlapping
or similar knowledge base outperform alliances in
which companies have no similar knowledge background
Fig. 3. Relationship between alliances and innovation according to the
articles reviewed.
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In seven instances, a neutral effect of alliances on
innovation is found. Comparing these results with the other
articles leads to three main conclusions. The ﬁrst conclusion
is that intensive forms of alliances have a positive impact on
innovation, whereas looser forms of collaboration like
licensing have a neutral impact (Anand and Khanna, 2000;
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). Among the studies
ﬁnding a positive effect of alliances on innovation, similar
conclusions have been put forth (Dyer, 1996, 2000): more
intense collaboration in alliances increases innovativeness.
An explanation for this may be that the knowledge exchange
required for innovative renewal requires close collaboration
betweenorganizations, because that improves the transfer of
knowledge between people. A second conclusion emanating
from a closer look at the studies showing a neutral impact is
that the issue of networks of alliances raises some further
questions. There seem to be network strategies that are more
conducive to innovation than other strategies (Powell et al.,
1996; Rowley et al., 2000). The optimal number of alliances
and the optimal density of alliance networks depend on
speciﬁc circumstances. For example, having many alliances
in combination with dense networks (with all partners
connected to each other) does not raise innovativeness. The
number of studies into this topic is limited and as a
consequence, it is impossible to draw any deﬁnite
conclusions. But the studies that have been carried out
show that the optimal alliance network depends on the
speciﬁc context of the organization. A third and ﬁnal
conclusion about studies ﬁnding a neutral impact relates to
government related alliances. Government sponsored
research alliances and alliances between universities and
companies show mixed results. Most studies present a
neutral or marginally positive effect of this type of
partnerships on the innovative strength of the companies
involved. However, government related alliances do seem
to lower the cost of innovation.
A negative relationship between alliances and innovation
is found inonly four cases. Duysters and Hagedoorn(2000a)
ﬁnd that alliances are not effective for developing core
competences in the short run. This seems logical because
most alliances have a short lifespan, whereas competence
building is a lengthy process. Vanhaverbeke et al. (2001)
show that a sub-optimal network strategy can diminish ﬁrm
innovation. Organizations with a large internal knowledge
base and a small alliance network or a small internal
knowledge base with a large network have higher rates of
innovation than ﬁrms pursuing other strategies. This further
reinforces the point made above about the impact of
networks on innovation. Sakakibara (1997a) ﬁnds that R&D
expense diminishes when alliance are entered with the
primary objective of cost saving. In general, the literature
assumes that higher levels of R&D expenditures are better
than lower ones. This seems to ignore the fact that more
effective innovation processes or economies of scale may
actually lead to lower R&D expense. The ‘negative’ ﬁnding
of Sakakibara may therefore not be negative at all: it seems
to be evident that R&D expense diminishes when cost
saving is the aim of an alliance. Similarly, Irwin and
Klenow (1996) ﬁnd that the Sematech consortium led to a
decrease of R&D spending of the partners involved. The
consortium did have a cost-saving effect. In short, the
negative ﬁndings in our review only pertain to very speciﬁc
situations or relate to cost-saving objectives of alliances.
5.1. Success measures and time horizon
In theory, the speciﬁc choice of success measures may
inﬂuence the results. An alliance scoring well on one
measure of success may not necessarily score well on
another (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). However, there appears to
be a high correlation between different measures of success
(Draulans et al., 2003; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003).
Naturally output measures like patents are preferred over
input measures like R&D expense. As noted above,
somewhat surprisingly higher R&D expense is always
seen as an indication of a higher rate of innovation in the
literature. This ignores the fact that some companies have a
higher R&D productivity than others. Especially when
collaboration between companies leads to an exchange of
best innovation practices, lower levels of R&D expenditures
not necessarily lead to a lower rate of innovation. Fig. 4
shows which particular criteria for success are used by the
articles reviewed in this study. Twenty percent of the
articles measure patenting behavior; a group of similar size
used other output of R&D as a measure of success. Another
20% studies the effect of R&D alliances on ﬁnancial
indicators like margin or revenue. Seventeen percent
involves event analysis of stock market reactions to the
announcement of a technology alliance. Ten percent looks
at R&D input measures like R&D budgets or number of
researchers assigned to the alliance. As already discussed
previously, some of the studies using R&D input measures
(Sakakibara, 1997a; Irwin and Klenow, 1996)ﬁ n da
negative relationship between alliances and innovation.
They ﬁnd that alliances have a cost-saving effect. Alliances
in that case do not increase the level of innovation, but they
do enable companies to innovate at lower cost. Apparently,
the realized cost savings are not reinvested in R&D.
Fig. 4. Success measures used in alliance articles reviewed.
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success measure used. Event analysis studies time periods
between a few days and a few months. Other research has a
time horizon of a few years, with 3 years being the most
prevalent. The choice of time horizon has no effect on the
performance of alliances. Both short and long time horizons
ﬁnd on average a positive effect of alliances on innovation.
5.2. Geographical setting
Fig. 5 shows the regional background of the studies. The
larger part of the studies relates to alliances in North
America (37%). Japan has received quite some attention as
well: 17% of the studies focus on this country. Europe has
only been looked at in 10% of the cases. The rest either
studies alliances with partners from a combination of these
three regions or did not specify the geographical
background. Mowery et al. (1996) provide some more
insight into the impact of nationality on success. They ﬁnd
that there is no difference between the innovative
performance of Japanese alliances and the performance of
American companies entering into alliances. Likewise,
Dyer (2000) ﬁnds that alliances in the car industry have a
positive impact on performance in both Japan and the USA.
Further comparative studies are not available.
5.3. Sectoral background
The majority of the articles reviewed study a high-tech
sector. Thirteen articles looked at the innovative potential of
alliances in IT and ﬁve articles examine biotechnology. The
other articles study a variety of different sectors. Only two
studies compare sectors. Ernst and Halevy (2000) show that
in turbulent sectors like high-tech and media, alliances
outperform mergers and acquisitions. Rowley et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that ﬂexible forms of alliances are successful in the
semiconductor industry, whereas stable forms of alliances
are more effective in the steel industry. This result
appears to contradict the idea that more intense
relationships stimulate innovation. The network perspective
chosen by these authors may provide an explanation for this.
Looser forms of alliances may not increase innovation by
themselves, but they may serve another purpose in terms of
the radar effect that was mentioned previously. By entering
into loose and ﬂexible arrangements with partners develop-
ing competing technologies, a ﬁrm will increase its chances
of having access to a successful technology. The impact of a
single relationship may be limited or neutral, but the impact
of the entire portfolio of relationships may be considerable.
In a large portfolio ofﬂexible alliances, quite some alliances
will not come to fruition. But the upside is that the chances
of missing out on a promising technology are drastically
reduced as well. If this option theory of alliances holds, it
does not make much sense to look at the innovative
potential of one singular alliance. Rather, the innovative
potential of a company’s portfolio needs to be assessed.
Given the paucity of research into sector and network
differences, it is not yet possible to draw deﬁnite
conclusions on this issue.
5.4. Conclusion on alliances
Overall, we can conclude that alliances increase the
innovativeness of ﬁrms. There are some conditions that
enhance this effect, like similar knowledge backgrounds of
the partners, a higher level of alliance capability and more
intense relationships. Alliances involving public support or
a public partner do not increase innovation, although they do
lower the cost of innovation. A major gap in the existing
research is associated with sector differences. Also,
differences among countries have not yet received much
attention. One implication for further research is that it does
not make much sense to lump all types of alliances together.
Clearly, different types of alliances like licensing, joint
ventures, publicly funded partnerships, etc. need to be
distinguished in order to meaningfully clarify the innovation
effect of alliances.
The most promising avenue for research appears to be in
the network area. Research into networks has shown that
entering into more and tighter alliances is not always better.
Some types of networks may have a neutral and perhaps
even a negative impact on innovation. As yet, precise
conclusions cannot be drawn. However, the studies
currently available clearly raise the question whether it is
meaningful at all to look at the effect of individual alliances
on innovation. Abstracting from the network perspective
may paint a brighter picture about the innovative potential
of alliances than warranted.
6. Review of literature: M&As
The number of studies into the relationship between
M&As and innovation is small. In a review by Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) of studies looking into the performance of
M&As, the emphasis is exclusively on ﬁnancial perform-
ance. In the course of the 1990s, a limited amount of studies Fig. 5. Regional background of alliance articles reviewed.
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(see Appendix A). These studies which can be divided
into two main types. The ﬁrst type measures the direct
impact of M&A on indicators of R&D. The second type are
studies about the conditions under which a merger or take-
over improves innovative performance. The latter type is
listed in Appendix A in italics. For the current review, the
ﬁrst type of studies is most relevant. The second type of
studies is reviewed here as well, because they may give
interesting clues about differences across sectors and
countries.
Of a total of 15 studies that have been reviewed, eight
belong to the ﬁrst category and seven to the second
category. Table 1 summarizes the results of the ﬁrst
category. Horizontally, the table shows whether studies
ﬁnd that M&As have a positive, neutral or negative effect on
innovation. Vertically, it shows the type of success measure
used; i.e. input or output. This element is particularly
relevant for M&A because the possibilities for cost saving
in M&A are much higher than for alliances. Input measures
may therefore decline steeply, giving the impression that
innovativeness declines, whereas in reality innovativeness
may remain at the same level but at lower cost. Especially
for M&As output measures are expected to provide the most
accurate measure of innovation.
Therefore, the results in Table 1 are striking. Especially,
studiesusingoutputmeasuresshowthatcompaniesengaging
in mergers and acquisitions face a decline in innovation.
Studiesusinganinputmeasurecomeupwithaneutraleffect.
These studies show that some economies of scale can be
reaped, but only to a limited extent. Finally, there are no
studies that ﬁnd a positive effect of M&A on innovation.
An analysis of the remaining seven studies shows that
innovation is better served when the ﬁrms involved have an
overlap in their knowledge base. Diversifying mergers and
acquisitions do worse in terms of innovation than M&As
among related companies. Secondly, when the process of
acquisition and integration runs smoothly the innovative
performance is higher as well. A well-developed post-
merger integration process therefore enhances innovation.
Unclear is the role of size in mergers and acquisitions.
Different and partly conﬂicting hypotheses have been
supported:
– Ahuja and Katila (2001) ﬁnd that large company should
focus their M&A activity on small targets if they would
like to increase their innovative performance;
– Chakrabarti et al. (1994) ﬁnd that innovative perform-
ance diminishes when a large company takes over a small
one and that M&As between companies of equal size
perform better;
– Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) also ﬁnd that M&As
between companies of similar size perform better.
Clearly, the issue of size has not yet received sufﬁcient
attention in research in order to be able to draw a deﬁnite
conclusion.
6.1. Time horizon
The choice of time horizon is even more important in the
case of M&As than it is for alliances. The real beneﬁts of
M&As will become clear only after quite some time has
passed and hence time horizons need to be relatively long.
The median time horizon of studies is 3 years. The
maximum time horizon is 5 years. There appears to be no
signiﬁcant impact of the choice of time horizon on the
research results. Studies either ﬁnd a neutral or a negative
effect on innovation, irrespectively of studying a 3-year or a
5-year period.
6.2. Geographical setting
Five articles study M&As in the USA, another three
articles study acquisitions with an American ﬁrm as the
acquirer. Other studies have focused on Germany and Japan.
Five studies examine international samples. In as far as it is
possible to draw conclusions from this limited amount of
variety, there appear to be no signiﬁcant differences
regarding the innovation success of mergers and acqui-
sitions in different countries.
6.3. Sectoral background
Three studies are performed in high-tech sectors, ﬁve in
industrial sectors, six across a variety of sectors and one
study does not report on the sector. Studies comparing
sectors are non-existent. Ernst and Halevy (2000) come
closest with their comparison of the use of alliances and
M&As in high-tech and non-high-tech sectors. They ﬁnd
that M&As perform worse in high-tech sectors as compared
to non-high-tech sectors. Link (1988), however, ﬁnds the
opposite result. The difference in time and focus may
explain these contradictory results. Link’s study was carried
out before the latest boom in alliance activity and before the
period in which high-tech mergers and acquisitions reached
their pinnacle. Overall, there is not much clarity about
sectoral differences in innovative performance of mergers
and acquisitions.
6.4. Conclusion on M&A
The main conclusions about the relationship between
mergers and acquisitions and innovation are: ﬁrst, they have
a neutral or negative effect on innovation; second, mergers
Table 1




Input-measure 0 3 1
Output-measure 0 1 3
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lowering the cost of innovation; three, well managed M&As
and M&As among related ﬁrms outperform poorly managed
M&As and diversifying M&As, respectively; fourth,
research is too scarce to draw meaningful conclusions
about the effects of size, national and sector differences.
7. Conclusions: M&A versus alliances
Despite the large number of publications about M&As
and alliances, few researchers have consistently compared
the effect of these modes of partnering on innovation.
Nonetheless, the studies reviewed here point to a very clear
overall conclusion: alliances are outperforming M&As in
terms of their effect on innovation. Except for the
possibilities offered by M&As to reap some economies of
scale in R&D, alliances outperform M&As on almost each
conceivable point. There is just one possible negative
exception, which is the network effect: some types
of alliance networks perform better than others.
The results on M&As are in line with other research
about M&A effectiveness (Schenk, 1996). In general, the
failure ratios of M&As are close to 70%, when stock market
reaction to M&As is measured. This effect is clearly
replicated in this study, which ﬁnds at best a neutral effect
of M&As on innovation. The exact causes for this are
unclear. Of the theoretical reasons for M&A failure, only
one is studied in the empirical articles we have reviewed:
effective post-merger integration has a soothing effect.
However, there is no research yet that shows that sound
post-merger integration ensures mergers success.
The success of alliances in enhancing innovation is
somewhat surprising given the fact that alliances have
high failure rates as well. Average success rates are
somewhat better than for M&As, but with 50–60% they
lead the ﬁeld by only a narrow margin. Our review shows
that research is in general very positive about the
innovation effect of alliances. A possible explanation for
this is that R&D alliances are more successful than other
types of alliances. Others have shown that alliances that
incorporate learning as a goal outperform other alliances
(Accenture, 2000). Since learning is always relevant for
R&D alliances, the fact that R&D alliances appear to
perform better than the average alliance may therefore
been explained. Another explanation relates to the set up
of this review. We examined the number of hypotheses
tested in the literature and their outcome. An article
ﬁnding a positive relationship between alliances and
innovation on average may still be based on a dataset in
which 40% of the technology alliances fail. This
explanation may be true, but it is in our view not very
likely. With failure rates of 50% and higher, more
negative results might have been expected. Moreover,
this explanation does not provide a reason for the gap
between our ﬁndings on M&A versus those on alliances.
There is no agreement in the current body of literature on
the explanation for these widely varying results in the
innovative performance of M&As and alliances. Looking at
the theoretical reasons for success and failure of alliances
versus M&As, the indigestibility argument is the most
distinctive reason, which may help to explain this difference
in performance. Empirical research into this phenomenon
has yet to be carried out.
8. Implications for research, management
and governmental policy
8.1. Research implications
The implications for researchinto the innovative effect of
collaboration emanate directly from the previous discus-
sion. The ﬁrst research question that needs to be addressed is
why the track record of M&A is so poor. There is no
satisfactory explanation for this. The continuing popularity
of M&A in practice suggests that there should be beneﬁts to
M&A, also in terms of innovation. Large-scale empirical
research does, however, not support this view.
A second research question, which needs to be answered
in more detail, pertains to the sectoral differences in alliance
activity. Available studies show that different types of
alliances may be more effective in different industry
conditions. A full-blown account of which types are best
under which conditions is absent. Empirically only a few
industries have been studied. Besides, there is a shortage of
theoretical explanations for this sector effect.
The most promising research trajectory, however,
pertains to networks. Looking from a network perspective,
some studies have shown that it is not just the performance
of individual alliances that should be measured. Rather, it is
the combination of alliances that determines a ﬁrm’s ability
to innovate. Some combinations may hamper innovation;
others may stimulate it. Relevant issues in this regard are the
relationship between a ﬁrm’s internal technology portfolio
and its external portfolio, the key characteristics of networks
and their effect on innovation, and whether the optimal
network characteristics differ per sector.
8.2. Management implications
The literature review has several implications for R&D
managers. The ﬁrst conclusion is related to the optimal
organization mode of collaboration. Alliances are to be
favored over M&As and they are an important source of
innovation. The road taken by many ﬁrms to enter into
alliances in order to develop new technologies is not a
management fad. Empirical research shows that alliances
increase innovation and that this technology strategy is
successful. The opposite conclusion holds for M&As.
Managers should not engage in M&As for innovative
renewal, unless cost saving in R&D is their goal.
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should take a critical look at alliances with partners whose
knowledge base does not overlap with that of their own ﬁrm.
As alliances with similar companies have more potential for
innovation, alliances with dissimilar companies should be
looked at critically. Of course some case study evidence
shows that even dissimilar companies can create inno-
vations, but the overall record is worse.
Third, companies need to build up capabilities to manage
alliances. Experience with alliances increases the chance
that collaboration leads to innovative success. Learning
from experience and investing in alliance speciﬁc manage-
ment methods (Draulans et al., 2003) will help ﬁrms to raise
their alliance success rate and their innovative potential.
8.3. Implications for governmental policy
The ﬁrst implication for governments pertains to anti-
trust policy. In as far as anti-trust policy has as an objective
to increase innovation, anti-trust authorities should allow
alliances in most of the cases. The theoretical arguments put
forth by Jorde and Teece (1990) to be lenient towards
alliances ﬁnd empirical support. However, anti-trust policy
also has the objective to avoid collusion in the market.There
is a chance that alliances, which start out in basic research,
may continue to exist when products are marketed. The
original technology partners may then collude in the market
and set higher prices and gain monopoly rents from their
innovation. Whether R&D alliances generally lead to
marketing alliances is a question that lies outside the
scope of this research. In the articles reviewed, there is one
such incidence of technology collaboration extending into
the market. Bekkers et al. (2002) show that in GSM
technology cross-licensing has led to a dominant group of
producers in the market. Whether this has any negative
economic effects, however, cannot be easily judged.
Anti-trust policy may be more critical concerning M&As,
as M&A activity does not appear to stimulate innovation.
For innovation policy, the previous study holds some
implications as well. Most clearly for cluster policy (Porter,
1990; Jacobs and de Man, 1996), which aims to stimulate
collaboration between companies in order to enhance
innovation.Atﬁrstsight,thispolicyseemstobecorroborated
by empirical research. However, there are some qualiﬁca-
tions. As not all types of collaboration are fruitful in all
industries, an industry speciﬁc approach may be required.
However, with the current state of our knowledge, it is not
possible to develop a more tailored approach. Governments
should therefore proceed with caution. A second qualiﬁca-
tion pertains to the network effect. There is a limit to the
number alliances and the composition of networks that favor
innovation. Although encouraging collaboration in clusters
may have positive effects in most of the cases, it cannot be
excludedthatitmayhaveanegativeimpactinothers.Again,
research is not clear about the best network strategies,
making it more difﬁcult for governments to develop correct
policies. A third qualiﬁcation concerns the role of public
private partnerships in clusters. Cluster policies assume that
collaboration between industry and universities and other
government sponsored research institutions has a positive
effect on innovation. This view is supported by empirical
research, although most studies ﬁnd that the effect of such
collaboration is only marginally positive. Governments
should not expect public private partnerships to have a
signiﬁcant impact on the competitive advantage of indus-
tries. Likewise, government sponsored R&D consortia only
have a limited effect on innovation, in spite of their effect on
lowering the cost of innovation.
Given the problems governments face in determining
efﬁcient innovation policies with respect to alliances,
another policy suggestion might be more interesting.
Governments may support the diffusion of alliance manage-
ment capabilities. Instead of stimulating collaboration as
such, which runs the chance that governments stimulate the
wrong type of collaboration, governments can redirect their
focus to stimulating the ability to collaborate. Although this
type of policy may be less eye-catching, it is a no regret
policy. By means of drawing attention of managers to
alliance management, sponsoring courses and workshops
and stimulating research into alliance best practices,
awareness of alliances and alliance management may
increase. Overall, it increases the alliance capabilities of
ﬁrms. This will certainly help companies to prepare for the
challenges of the network economy, which is taking shape
in an increasing number of innovative industries.
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